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Proneness to unusual perceptual states e such as auditory or visual hallucinations e has
been proposed to exist on a continuum in the general population, but whether there is a
cognitive basis for such a continuum remains unclear. Intentional cognitive inhibition (the
ability to wilfully control thoughts and memories) is one mechanism that has been linked
to auditory hallucination susceptibility, but most evidence to date has been drawn from
clinical samples only. Moreover, such a link has yet to be demonstrated over and above
relations to other cognitive skills (source monitoring) and cognitive states (intrusive
thoughts) that often correlate with both inhibition and hallucinations. The present study
deployed two tests of intentional inhibition ability e the Inhibition of Currently Irrelevant
Memories (ICIM) task and Directed Forgetting (DF) task e and one test of source monitoring
(a source memory task) to examine how cognitive task performance relates to self-reported
i) auditory hallucination-proneness and ii) susceptibility to intrusive thoughts in a non-
clinical student sample (N ¼ 76). Hierarchical regression analyses were used to assess
the independent and combined contributions of task performance to proneness scores.
ICIM performance but not DF or source memory scores were significantly related to both
hallucination-proneness and intrusive thoughts. Further analysis suggested that intrusive
thoughts may mediate the link between intentional inhibition skills and auditory
hallucination-proneness, suggesting a potential pathway from inhibition to perception via
intrusions in cognition. The implications for studying cognitive mechanisms of halluci-
nation and their role in “continuum” views of psychosis-like experiences are discussed.
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).hology, Durham University, Science Laboratories, South Road, Durham, DH1 3LE, UK.
durham.ac.uk (B. Alderson-Day).
y Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommo
1 Healthy participants were included in Soriano et al. (2009) but
only as control participants, without a measure of their own
potential proneness to hallucinations.
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Psychosis and psychosis-like experiences have been proposed
to occur on a continuum linking clinical and non-clinical pop-
ulations (Johns & van Os, 2001; Strauss, 1969). Accordingly, the
cognitive mechanisms that may underlie unusual beliefs (de-
lusions) and perceptions (hallucinations) have also been
posited to exist on a continuum, with variations in cognitive
skills acting as an extended phenotype of psychosis suscepti-
bility (Allen, Freeman, Johns, & McGuire, 2006; Freeman, Pugh,
& Garety, 2008; Kelleher, Clarke, Rawdon, Murphy, & Cannon,
2013). While the notion of a psychosis continuum has been
challenged (David, 2010), evidence of cognitive processes being
atypical in similar ways for both clinical and non-clinical
hallucination-prone groups has been treated as a key piece of
supporting evidence for a continuum view (Brookwell, Bentall,
& Varese, 2013). In the case of auditory hallucinations (AH), one
putative underlying mechanism is cognitive inhibition
(Badcock & Hugdahl, 2012; Waters et al., 2012).
AH are typically intrusive and uncontrollable experiences
(David, 1999; although see; Powers, Kelley, & Corlett, 2017),
making problems with inhibitory control a plausible part of
their causal explanation. General difficultieswith inhibition are
evident in people with schizophrenia (Westerhausen, Kompus,
&Hugdahl, 2011), 60e90% ofwhom experience AH (Bauer et al.,
2011). However, specific relations between inhibitory control
and hallucinations are relatively scarce in the literature.
Instead, it has been argued that a specific problem with
“intentional cognitive inhibition” e the ability to consciously
and willingly suppress information from working memory e
plays an important role in AH (Badcock, Waters, Maybery, &
Michie, 2005). Evidence for this has largely come from contin-
uous recognition paradigms such as the Inhibition of Current
IrrelevantMemories (ICIM) task (Schnider& Ptak, 1999;Waters,
Badcock, Michie, &Maybery, 2006), in which participants must
learn to recognise a series of picture targets, then ignore the
impulse to respond to them on subsequent rounds containing
new targets. Participants with schizophrenia and AH make
more false alarms on the ICIM than patients without AH and
healthy controls, and this correlates with AH severity (Badcock
et al., 2005; Waters, Badcock, Maybery, & Michie, 2003). Sup-
porting evidence has also come from studies of “directed
forgetting”, in which participants are instructed to forget pre-
viously learned words or word lists, but then later tested on
their recall (Bjork & Woodward, 1973; Geiselman, Bjork, &
Fishman, 1983). While healthy participants typically show a
directed forgetting effect (i.e., reduced recall for words in
“forget” versus “remember” lists; Conway, Harries, Noyes,
Racsmany, & Frankish, 2000), participants with schizophrenia
forget fewer words (Racsmany et al., 2008) and this correlates
with hallucination severity in patients with AH (Soriano,
Jimenez, Roman, & Bajo, 2009).
Findings such as these have been used to argue for inhi-
bition playing an important role in understanding hallucina-
tions more generally, both clinically (across various
modalities and diagnoses), and as a marker for hallucination
susceptibility in the general population (Badcock & Hugdahl,
2014; Ford et al., 2014; Jardri et al., 2016). However, evidence
is more limited for intentional inhibition specifically beinglinked to hallucination-proneness in non-clinical populations
(e.g., hearing a telephone ring when it has not). In one study,
Paulik, Badcock, and Maybery (2007) found that those high in
hallucination-proneness were more likely to make false
alarms on the ICIM task than those low in hallucination-
proneness. This was partially replicated by Badcock,
Mahfouda, and Maybery (2015), who observed poorer ICIM
performance in healthy individuals high in hypomanic traits
and hallucination-proneness. There is also evidence of
hallucination-proneness in non-clinical samples being related
to false alarms during free recall (Brebion, Larøi, & Van der
Linden, 2010) and errors on false memory tasks (Sugimori,
Asai, & Tanno, 2011). However, the extent to which unwit-
ting errors during general recall represent intentional inhibi-
tion (in the same way that ICIM and directed forgetting tasks
are proposed to index) is unclear, given that such errors are
usually taken to reflect unintentional and unconscious
inhibitory processes (Nigg, 2000; Paulik, Badcock, & Maybery,
2008). Beyond this, systematic investigation of the relations
between intentional inhibition and hallucination-proneness
in healthy samples has not been examined, either on the
ICIM, or on alternative tasks such as directed forgetting.1
One concern about the link between AH and intentional
inhibition is specificity, given that other cognitive and psy-
chopathological factors could plausibly mediate any rela-
tionship between the two. First, hallucination-proneness has
often been linked to atypical source monitoring (Brookwell
et al., 2013) i.e., the ability to track and distinguish the origin
of information (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Dis-
ruptions to sourcemonitoring have long been proposed as the
process by which internal cognitions could be experienced as
coming from another agent, via disruption to internal pre-
dictive models (Frith, 1992) and biases to attribute sensations
to external sources (Bentall, 1990). Clinical participants with
frequent AH often have difficulties with source monitoring
(Brebion, Ohlsen, Bressan, & David, 2012; Moritz, Woodward,
& Ruff, 2003; Woodward, Menon, & Whitman, 2007) with
more mixed evidence reported in non-clinical samples
(Garrison et al., 2017; Larøi, Van der Linden, & Marczewski,
2004). As noted by Badcock et al. (2005), there is a source
monitoring demand on the ICIM, given that participants must
track targets from current and previous rounds in order to
respond correctly. It has also been suggested that the directed
forgetting effect is driven by demands of monitoring the
change in context between the “forget” and “remember” lists,
rather than intentional suppression of the “forget” list
(Sahakyan, Delaney, Foster, & Abushanab, 2013; Sahakyan &
Kelley, 2002). As such, relations between inhibition and
hallucination-proneness may therefore actually reflect indi-
rect demands on source monitoring, rather than a direct or
independent pathway for hallucinatory experience. This
needs to be tested empirically by including measures of both
inhibition and source monitoring in the same study.
Second, intentional inhibition performance has been
studied in relation to a range of conditions characterised not
by AH, but by intrusive thoughts (such as obsessive-
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Bannon, Gonsalvez, Croft, & Boyce, 2002). The strong overlap
between intrusive thoughts and AH (Jones & Fernyhough,
2009; Morrison, Haddock, & Tarrier, 1995) serves to compli-
cate attempts to link hallucinations to inhibition. It is possible
that atypical performance on tasks such as the ICIM or
directed forgetting are associated with a general proneness to
intrusive cognitions (e.g., Verwoerd, Wessel, & de Jong, 2009),
rather than hallucination-proneness specifically. That is, a
susceptibility to intrusions in cognition could be an important
mediating state between inhibitory control and hallucina-
tions, such that some thoughts then go on to be the contents
of hallucinatory experiences (Morrison et al., 1995).
To address these issues, we present an investigation of
intentional inhibition, source monitoring, hallucination-
proneness and intrusive thoughts in a sample of non-clinical
participants. We first attempted a replication of Paulik et al.
(2007) by testing whether false alarms on the ICIM predicted
hallucination-proneness scores on a commonly-used mea-
sure, the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (hypothesis 1). We
then sought to extend Paulik's finding using a directed
forgetting task, hypothesising that those with greater
hallucination-proneness would be less effective at forgetting
items when instructed to, i.e., a reduced directed forgetting
effect (hypothesis 2). Using a source memory task, we exam-
ined whether source monitoring could account for any re-
lations observed between intentional inhibition and
hallucination-proneness (hypothesis 3). Finally, we also
collected scores for intrusive thoughts from the White Bear
Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) to test
whether performance on the above tasks primarily predicted
intrusions rather than hallucination-proneness (hypothesis
4). If so, this would suggest a mediating role for intrusive
cognitions between inhibition and hallucinations.2. Method
2.1. Participants
76 participants (65 female), aged 18e28 years (M ¼ 20.21,
SD ¼ 1.67) were recruited from university settings. Partici-
pants were required to be over 18, native English speakers,
with normal or corrected-to-normal hearing or vision and no
prior neurological diagnosis (these criteria were clearly stated
in the study advertising and participant information prior to
consent being taken). The majority of participants were white
British (71.05%). The study was advertised via a departmental
online participant pool, an email circular to university staff
and students, social media, and word of mouth. All proced-
ures were approved by a university research ethics commit-
tee. Participants received course credit or gift vouchers for
their participation.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Inhibition of Current Irrelevant Memories task
The ICIM e adapted from Paulik et al. (2007) e consisted of
three runs, each containing sequential presentation of black
and white line drawings (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). Foreach picture, participants were required to decide whether it
was previously presented within the current run (a ‘target’
item). Images were displayed in the centre of a computer
screen for 2000 ms with an inter-stimulus interval of 700 ms.
There was a 30s break between runs one and two, and a 5-min
break between runs two and three (during which time par-
ticipants began an arithmetic distractor task). With each
image display, participants were askedwhether they had seen
it before, responding with a button press (answering ‘1’ if they
thought it was the first time they saw the picture, and ‘2’ if
they thought it was a repeat). The order of pictures (and status
as targets) changed between runs, with no targets repeating
across runs. Each run included the same 60 unique images: 40
pictures were presented only once, 5 pictures were presented
twice and 15 pictures were presented three times (totalling 95
image presentations). In total there were therefore 35 oppor-
tunities to identify a repeat (classed as a “hit”) and 60 oppor-
tunities per run to make a false alarm by classifying a first
presentation as a repeat. However, the 20 targets from run 1
were expected to be particularly likely to prompt false alarms
in run 2, while the targets from runs 1 and 2 in turn had to be
resisted on run 3. Although inhibitory demands may be ex-
pected to keep increasing with each run (given the growing
number of items that were previous targets), in practice false
alarm rates do not change substantially from run 2 onwards
(e.g., Paulik et al., 2007). We therefore followed other prior
studies in using the combined number of false alarms made
on runs 2 and 3 as the primary outcome on the task. Perfor-
mance after run 1 is often aggregated to study intentional
inhibition effects, as the observed effect (and relation to hal-
lucinations) is thought to be generally evident from run 2
onwards (Waters et al., 2003).
2.2.2. Directed forgetting task
TheDirected Forgetting (DF) taskwas amodified version of the
task used by Conway et al. (2000), which included a forget and a
remember condition. In both conditions, participants viewed
two lists of 10 words and were tested on their recall following
a 5-min delay. Each word was presented in the middle of the
computer screen for 2 s, with a 2s inter-stimulus interval. In
the forget condition, following presentation of List 1 partici-
pants were told that what they had seen was in fact a practice
list to familiarise you with the presentation rate and type of words.
You should now put these words out of mind, try to forget them and
not let them interfere with learning the experimental list which will
be presented now. They then proceeded to view the words for
List 2. In the remember condition, participants instead saw the
following instructions between Lists 1 and 2: That is the end of
the words on list one. Youmust try to keep those in mind as you learn
the second list which will be presented now. Participants then
completed a distractor task (arithmetic puzzles) for 5 min,
before being asked towrite down asmanywords as they could
remember from both lists, starting with the first list (to
counteract the potential interference effects of recalling list 2
items first). All participants completed both remember and
forget conditions, with the order being counterbalanced across
the sample. The DF effect is typically measured in terms of
reduced recall on list 1 of the forget condition, either in com-
parison to list 1 for the remember condition (Conway et al.,
2000) or list 2 of the forget condition (Soriano et al., 2009).
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respectively of directed forgetting (Sahakyan et al., 2013).
2.2.3. Source memory task (SMT)
The SMT was adapted from the version used in Experiment 2
of Garrison et al. (2017). The task comprised of a learning and a
test phase. The learning phase involved presentation of 48
partially completed word phrases (e.g., bacon and e_ _). When
the word ‘Other’ was displayed in the trial, participants were
required to listen to the word being read out by a male voice.
When the word ‘You’ was displayed, participants were
instructed to complete and read the word pairs out loud. The
generation and test phase were separated by a 20-min break,
during which the participant completed the questionnaire
pack, and a signal detection task (not reported here). During
the test phase, the word pairs from the generation phase were
presented again in separate trials, as well as 24 additional
distractor word pairs. For each trial, participants were
required to decide whether they had heard the word, spoken
the word themselves, or whether they thought it was a
completely new (distractor) word. The primary outcome var-
iable was accuracy in recalling the correct source of the old
items (i.e., self or other), expressed as a percentage of all items
that were correctly identified as old rather than new. We also
calculated an index of old-new discrimination: the proportion
of trials in which old versus new trials were correctly identi-
fied (even if the self/other source was confused). Higher ac-
curacy scores indicated better performance on the task and
source monitoring abilities (Garrison et al., 2017).
2.2.4. Revised Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale e auditory
This scale includes nine items derived from McCarthy-Jones
and Fernyhough (2011), which itself is a version adapted
fromMorrison, Wells, and Nothard (2000)'s Revised LSHS. The
scale consists of five statements relating to auditory halluci-
nations (e.g., “I hear people call my name and find that nobody
has done so.”) and four statements related to visual modality
of hallucinations (Items 6e9; e.g., “I see shadows and shapes
when there is nothing there”). Ratings are made on a four-
point Likert scale ranging from “Never” (1) to “Almost al-
ways” (4). To specifically examine auditory hallucination-
proneness (as per prior studies, e.g., Waters et al., 2003), only
the auditory items were included in the present analysis; vi-
sual items were collected to test for specificity only (see
Supplementary Materials). Scores on the auditory subscale
(LSHS-A henceforth) can range from 5 to 20, where higher
scores indicate greater hallucination-proneness. The LSHS
has been shown to have acceptable internal reliability
(McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 2011).
2.2.5. White Bear Suppression Inventory
This 15-item self-report questionnaire includes five state-
ments relating to thought intrusion and 10 items relating to
thought suppression (H€oping & de Jong-Meyer, 2003; Wegner
& Zanakos, 1994). Ratings are made on a five-point scale
ranging from “Strongly disagree” (1) to “Strongly agree” (5). To
specifically examine the role of intrusive thoughts, only the 5-
item intrusion subscale described by Jones and Fernyhough
(2006) was used in the present analysis (WBSI-I). Scores on
this subscale could range from 5 to 25, where higher scoresindicate higher levels of intrusive thoughts. Previous studies
have reported high levels of internal reliability for this sub-
scale (e.g., Jones, Fernyhough, & Meads, 2009).
2.3. Procedure
All testing was carried out in a quiet laboratory room. Partic-
ipants were told that they would be taking part in a study of
“cognitive performance, intrusive thoughts, and unusual ex-
periences”. Presentation of each task was with experimental
software EPrime 2.0. The auditory stimuli presented in the
SMT were played through over-ear Sennheiser HD206 head-
phones at a comfortable volume. The volume of stimuli could
be adjusted during a practice trial, but no participant required
this during testing. Each experimental session commenced
with either the forget or remember of the DF task, depending on
the order assigned to a participant. This was followed by the
learning phase of the SMT, completion of the questionnaire
pack, SMT test phase, ICIM, and then the remaining condition
of the DF task. Both the SMT and ICIM were preceded by a
short series of practice trials.
2.4. Data analysis
Unless otherwise specified, all data analysis was conducted
in jamovi v0.9.2.9. Before hypothesis-testing, all main
outcome variables were assessed for normality. Based on a
combination of normality tests, QQ plot inspection and
scores for skew and kurtosis, the following variables were
transformed using a natural logarithm to facilitate homoge-
neity of residuals for regression analysis: Launay-Slade
Hallucination Scale e Auditory (LSHS-A) and Visual (LSHS-
V), and ICIM false alarm rates (runs 2e3). For descriptive
statistics and pairwise correlations, non-transformed scores
are included here for ease of interpretation. ICIM and DF task
performance was analysed first using repeated measures
ANOVA and paired t-tests to establish the presence of typical
within-subjects effects on each task (i.e., an increase in false
alarms from run 1 to run 2 and 3 in the former, and a dif-
ference between remember and forget conditions in the
latter). Relations between inhibition performance and
hallucination-proneness were then assessed using hierar-
chical linear regression, with LSHS-A scores as the depen-
dent variable. The same analysis was then repeated for
intrusive thoughts, with WBSI-I scores as the dependent
variable. Correlations reported are Spearman's Rho correla-
tion co-efficients.3. Results
3.1. Descriptive statistics and within-subjects effects
Fig. 1 displays the distribution of hallucination-proneness
scores (LSHS-A), while Table 1 displays mean scores and pri-
mary outcomes for the three tasks. As can be seen from Fig. 1,
the LSHS-A distribution was positively skewed with the ma-
jority of participants reporting relatively low scores; however,
this still included a quarter of participants scoring at 50% or
above of the maximum score (20).
Fig. 1 e Distribution of auditory hallucination-proneness
scores. LSHS-A ¼ Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale e
Auditory. Blue line ¼ mean. Green lines ¼ 25/75%
quartiles. Max. score ¼ 20.
Table 1 e Mean scores for ICIM, directed forgetting, and
source memory.
M(SD)
ICIM Hits False Alarms
Run 1 33.28 (1.69) 1.96 (2.06)
Run 2 30.38 (3.75) 6.87 (5.97)
Run 3 31.86 (3.20) 5.51 (5.58)
Directed Forgetting Forget Remember
Forget Condition First
List 1 5.36 (2.54) 4.90 (2.85)
List 2 5.95 (2.25) 5.18 (3.28)
Remember Condition First
List 1 4.27 (3.03) 5.49 (2.78)
List 2 5.16 (3.18) 5.35 (2.88)
Source Memory Mean % Score*
Self & Other Correct 37.86 (4.98) 89.25 (7.13)
Old & New Correct 64.24 (3.82) 89.22 (5.30)
N ¼ 76. ICIM ¼ Inhibition of Current Irrelevant Memories. * For Self-
Other scores, % score is out of all trials correctly classed as old (i.e.,
does not include self/other trials mistaken for new trials); Old/New
correct is out of all trials (72).
Fig. 2 e Line graph showing number of false alarms in each
run of the ICIM task. Participants made significantly more
false alarms on runs 2 and 3 of the task, compared to run 1,
reflecting failure to inhibit previously seen images. Error
bars ¼ 95% confidence intervals. Dots ¼ individual data
points.
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repeatedmeasures ANOVA, indicating a significant effect of run,
F(2, 150) ¼ 37.39, p < .001, m2p ¼ .33. As Fig. 2 shows, participants
made significantlymore false alarms in run 2 compared to run 1
(t(75) ¼ 8.30, p < .001, d ¼ .95), and significantly more false
alarms in run 3 than run 1 (t(75) ¼ 6.16, p < .001, d ¼ .71). There
was a small but significant decrease in false alarms between
runs 2 and 3 (t(75) ¼ 2.30, p ¼ .024, d ¼ .26)2.2 As can be seen in Fig. 2, there were a number of high-scoring
participants for false alarms on runs 2 and 3 that could be
considered outlier cases. As the removal of these cases made
little difference to the results of the repeated measures ANOVA or
subsequent regression analysis, they were included for the
remainder of the analyses; any departures from the main results
are noted below.To establish the presence of a direct forgetting effect, the
DF taskwas initially analysed in a 2 2 2 repeatedmeasures
ANOVA, assessing the main and interaction effects of word
list (1 or 2), condition (forget or remember), and testing order
(whether the forget condition ran at the start or end of the
testing sessions). The only significant effect this producedwas
a condition  order interaction, F(1, 74) ¼ 6.94, p ¼ .010,
m2p ¼ .09, suggesting that testing order had affected how some
participants responded to the remember versus forget cues (all
other F < 2.80, p > .100). As the means in Table 1 indicate,
participants in either testing order appeared to show a “cost”
effect of directed forgetting (list 1 recall < list 2 recall for the
forget condition), but only those who attempted the remember
condition first showed the “benefit” effect (list 1 recall for
remember > list 1 recall for forget). This was supported by a
follow-up ANOVA comparing list 1 and list 2 recall for the
forget condition only, including testing order as a between-
subjects variable: a main effect of list was observed, F(1,
74) ¼ 4.61, p ¼ .035, m2p ¼ .06, but neither a main effect of order
nor an interaction effect were observed (all F < 3.20, p > .080).
As an individual differences index of the DF effect, we there-
fore used the “cost” effect: list 2 recall - list 1 recall in the forget
condition. This is equivalent to the index used by Soriano et al.
(2009). No significant difference in LSHS-A scores was evident
between participants who completed the different task orders
(ManneWhitney U ¼ 605.00, p ¼ .223, N ¼ 76).
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and hallucination-proneness
Table 2 displays the correlation matrix between performance
on the ICIM, DF, sourcememory and hallucination-proneness.
Consistent with our first hypothesis, ICIM performance posi-
tively correlated with hallucination-proneness (p ¼ .046).
Poorer source memory performance correlated with false
alarms on the ICIM (p¼ .023) andDF performance (p¼ .034) but
not hallucination-proneness (p ¼ .831). DF and ICIM scores did
not correlate (p ¼ .785).
A linear regression analysis was run using ICIM perfor-
mance in block 1, DF performance in block 2, and source
memory performance in block 3, with LSHS-A as the
dependent variable (using log-transformed scores for ICIM
and LSHS-A data). As shown in Table 3, the initial model
was significant, with ICIM false alarms significantly pre-
dicting LSHS-A scores (stan. b ¼ .243, p ¼ .035), in line with
hypothesis 1. However, neither the addition of DF scores in
block 2 (D R2 < .001, F(1, 73) ¼ .04, p ¼ .850) nor source
memory scores in block 3 (D R2 < .001, F(1, 73) ¼ .03, p ¼ .853)
made significant contributions to the model. In the final
model only ICIM scores predicted hallucination-proneness
(see Table 3i.). Therefore, hypotheses 2 and 3 were not
supported: any intentional inhibition effects indexed by the
DF did not predict hallucination-proneness, and source
memory could not account for the predictive relation
evident for ICIM.
A number of different outcomes and approaches are fav-
ouredwhen indexing sourcememory: for example, it has been
suggested that self-other errors are of particular theoretical
interest (given their relevance to externalising biases), while
new items on the taskmay also be considered “lures” to create
false alarms. To examine this, we reran the final combined
models of the above analyses (i.e., block 3), each time replac-
ing the sourcememory scorewith i) self-other errors, ii) other-
self errors, and iii) all new-old errors (i.e., new trialsmarked as
“self” and new trials marked as “other”). However, this made
little difference to the main results: in each case, source
memory failed to predict LSHS-A score (all p > .05, all stan.
В < .22), while ICIM false alarmswere a significant predictor in
every model (.02 < p < .035).
To test for specificity, we also ran the above analysis
with visual hallucination-proneness scores (LSHS-V) as the
dependent variable (see Supplementary Materials, Table 1).
Visual scores correlated with false alarms on the ICIM
(r ¼ .26, p ¼ .02) but none of the other main task outcomes
(all r < .11, all p > .37). Regression analysis usingTable 2 e Correlations among ICIM, signal detection,
source memory, and LSHS-A scores.
Directed
Forgetting
Source
Memory
LSHS-A
ICIM False Alarms (2e3) .03 .26a .23a
Directed Forgetting e .24a .03
Source Memory e e .02
LSHS-A e e e
a p < .05, two-tailed. N ¼ 76.transformed ICIM and LSHS-V scores highlighted a signifi-
cant relationship between the two in each block of the
model, as was the case for auditory scores. However, the
model did not produce normal residuals (a required
assumption for regression analysis), even with the use of
log-transformed variables.
3.3. The role of intrusive thoughts
Our fourth hypothesis was that cognitive task performance
may be associated with a susceptibility to intrusive thoughts,
rather than hallucination-proneness per se. To examine this,
we first reran the above analyses with WBSI Intrusion scores
as the dependent variable (with ICIM scores in block 1, DF
scores in block 2, and source memory scores in block 3). This
produced very similar results to those found for the LSHS-A: in
the final model, only false alarms on the ICIM predicted in-
trusions (stan. b ¼ .300, p ¼ .011, see table 3ii), whereas no
significant contributions were evident for DF and source
memory (all p > .30). This supported hypothesis 4: ICIM per-
formance e but not source memory or DF e was related to
intrusive thoughts.
To further explore the relation between intrusions,
hallucination-proneness, and ICIM performance, we then
compared regression models where i) ICIM and WBSI scores
predicted LSHS-A, and ii) ICIM and LSHS-A scores predicted
WBSI scores. For i) predicting LSHS-A scores, the overallmodel
was significant (R2¼ .207, F(2, 73)¼ 9.52, p< .001), but when the
contribution of WBSI scores was taken into account (stan.
b ¼ .404, p < .001, 95% C.I. ¼ .19e.062), ICIM scores no longer
predicted hallucination-proneness (stan. b ¼ .120, p ¼ .227,
95% C.I. ¼ .10 e .34). This was also true for the second
analysis (ii), althoughwhile LSHS-A scores predicted intrusion
scores (stan. b ¼ .389, p < .001, 95% C.I. ¼ .18e.60), there was
only a trend for ICIM scores to still predict WBSI scores (stan.
b ¼ .210, p ¼ .050, 95% C.I. ¼ .00e.42; R2 ¼ .236, F(2, 73) ¼ 11.24,
p < .001).
This suggested that intrusion scores may mediate the
relation between hallucination-proneness scores and ICIM
performance (i.e., hallucination-proneness acting as a
mediator). To further test this, we conducted a mediation
analysis using hallucination-proneness (LSHS-A score) as the
dependent variable, ICIM performance (number of false
alarms) as the predictor variable, and intrusive thoughts
(WBSI scores) as the mediator. Mediation analysis was car-
ried out with jamovi software, using the ‘medmod’ package
(Selker, 2017). The direct effect of ICIM performance on
hallucination-proneness was not significant (B ¼ .04,
SE ¼ .04, p ¼ .264). However, there was an indirect effect of
ICIM performance on hallucination-proneness through
intrusive thoughts (B ¼ .04, SE ¼ .02, p ¼ .025), indicating that
intrusions fully mediated the association between inhibition
and hallucination-proneness.33 As before, this analysis was repeated after excluding the five
participants who made very high number of false alarms in runs
2 or 3. In this case, after exclusion, the indirect effect of ICIM false
alarms on hallucination-proneness through intrusive thoughts
became non-significant (B ¼ .40, SE ¼ .02, p ¼ .052).
Table 3 e Hierarchical regression analysis for i) predicting auditory hallucination-proneness and ii) intrusive thoughts.
B SE B Beta t p C.I.(95%) F df p R2
i) LSHS-A
ICIM False Alarms .09 .04 .24 2.15 .04 .01 .17 4.64 1, 74 .04 .06
ICIM False Alarms .09 .04 .25 2.14 .04 .02 .48 2.31 2,73 .11 .06
Directed Forgetting .00 .01 .02 .02 .85 .21 .25
ICIM False Alarms .09 .04 .25 2.12 .04 .01 .49 1.53 3,72 .21 .06
Directed Forgetting .00 .01 .03 .23 .82 .21 .27
Source Memory (Self-Other) .09 .51 .02 .19 .85 .22 .26
ii) WBSI-I
ICIM False Alarms 1.45 .53 .30 2.75 .01 .40 2.50 7.57 1, 74 .01 .09
ICIM False Alarms 1.37 .53 .29 2.57 .01 .06 .51 4.32 2,73 .02 .11
Directed Forgetting .15 .15 .12 1.03 .31 .34 .11
ICIM False Alarms 1.43 .55 .30 2.60 .01 .07 .53 2.93 3,72 .04 .11
Directed Forgetting .13 .15 .10 .86 .39 .33 .13
Source Memory (Self-Other) 3.20 6.53 .06 .49 .63 .18 .29
N ¼ 76. ICIM ¼ Inhibition of Current Irrelevant Memories.
LSHS-A ¼ Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale e Auditory subscale. WBSI-I ¼White Bear Suppression Inventory e Intrusions subscale.
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context confusion (TCC) score
One difficultywith usingmeasures such as false alarms on the
ICIM is that they do not measure errors in the context of
overall task performance, whether in terms of correct re-
sponses to targets (hits) or general memory performance (e.g.,
run 1 scores). Since its first application in hallucinations
research (Waters et al., 2003), studies using versions of the
ICIM have also included a “temporal context confusion score”,
which is thought to act as a marker of howmuch participants
confuse information between ICIM lists (Nahum, Bouzerda-
Wahlen, Guggisberg, Ptak, & Schnider, 2012). The TCC score
is calculated by:
Run2FAsþ Run3FAs
Run2Hitsþ Run3Hits
Run1FAs
Run1Hits
The TCC has a strong positive correlation with failures to
correctly monitor other contextual information in a task
(Nahum et al., 2012; Schnider, von D€aniken, & Gutbrod, 1996).
It also provides an index of how many mistakes participants
are making relative to their own baseline of memory perfor-
mance, given that errors on run 1 are thought to reflect
working memory rather than inhibitory skills.
When the above analyses were rerun (see Supplementary
Materials Table 2), a stronger contribution was evident for
TCC score when predicting hallucination-proneness than was
previously observed for false alarms (stan. b ¼ .306, p ¼ .007,
95% C.I.¼ .15e.93) and thiswas still the casewhenDF and SMT
scores were added for blocks 2 and 3 (stan. b ¼ .323, p ¼ .007,
95% C.I. ¼ .09e.56). For intrusive thoughts, the TCC was also a
significant predictor in all three blocks, but generally with
lower parameter estimates than for predicting hallucination-
proneness (stan. b ¼ .23e.25). Taken together, TCC scores
from the ICIM appeared to be a potentially more sensitive
index of hallucination-proneness, while false alarms were
more consistently related to intrusive thoughts.4. Discussion
The primary aim of this study was to test whether intentional
inhibition relates to hallucination-proneness in a non-clinical
sample, even when other important factors e such as source
monitoring and intrusive thoughts e are taken into account.
Our first hypothesis was that scores for auditory
hallucination-proneness would be predicted by performance
on the Inhibition of Current Irrelevant Memories (ICIM) task
(hypothesis 1): this was supported, providing a replication of
the effect observed by Paulik et al. (2007). This relationship
with hallucination-proneness did not extend to a second test
of intentional inhibition e the Directed Forgetting (DF) task
(hypothesis 2)e but it was robust to the contribution of source
monitoring, as indexed by a source memory task (hypothesis
3). The relationship with intrusive thoughts was more com-
plex: false alarms on the ICIM appear to be a stronger index of
intrusions than hallucination-proneness (hypothesis 4), and
further analysis suggested that intrusive thoughts mediated
the association between intentional inhibition and halluci-
nation-proneness.
The significant relationship between hallucination-
proneness scores and performance on the ICIM supports prior
findings by Paulik et al. (2007), who found group differences on
ICIMperformancebetween thosehighand low inhallucination-
proneness (see also Badcock et al., 2015). Our study builds on
this bydemonstrating that this isunlikely to result fromsource-
monitoring demands on the ICIM. Instead, it supports the idea
that intentional cognitive inhibition plays an important part in
susceptibility to hallucinatory experiences (Badcock et al., 2005;
Waters et al., 2003) andmay showpotential as a transdiagnostic
marker of AH (Badcock & Hugdahl, 2014).
However, the lack of any relation between DF performance
and hallucination-proneness suggests that the concept of
intentional inhibition requires further close examination. If it
is a viable cognitive marker (of hallucinations or intrusions),
c o r t e x 1 1 3 ( 2 0 1 9 ) 2 6 7e2 7 8274then other inhibition paradigms should also be able to
demonstrate links with psychopathology-like traits in the
same way as the ICIM; both paradigms have been used as
specific examples of intentional and conscious suppression of
information from working memory, as opposed to more
automatic and association-based intrusions into recall (Paulik
et al., 2008; Racsmany et al., 2008). In our data, one possibility
is that the presence of order effects between participants on
theDF taskmay have obscured amore robust forgetting effect,
in that participants who completed the forget condition first
may not have encoded list 1 of the remember condition as
strongly if they were expecting another forget cue to appear.
Thewithin-subjects design used heree sometimes referred to
as a “four list” design (Sahakyan et al., 2013) e is not common
compared to between-subjects approaches (Conway et al.,
2000), but when such designs are used, they have been
robust to order effects (e.g., Zellner & B€auml, 2006). Moreover,
we did observe a “cost” effect between the two forget lists,
despite differences in condition order: this effect in particular
has been previously related to hallucination severity in pa-
tients (Soriano et al., 2009). As such, it is unclear whether
establishing amore robust DF effect would have substantively
changed the main results regarding hallucination-proneness.
Another possibility is that the DF paradigm does not
actually index inhibition skills: it has been argued that context
changes betweenword lists drive the effect instead (Sahakyan
et al., 2013) and the role of inhibition in similar paradigms e
such as Think/No Think tasks e has been questioned (Noreen
& MacLeod, 2015). However, the wide range of groups who
struggle with such tasks include many who are susceptible to
problems with inhibition, including older adults (Aslan &
B€auml, 2013) and people with Alzheimer's Disease (Haj,
Fasotti, & Allain, 2014), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
(Konishi, Shishikura, Nakaaki, Komatsu,&Mimura, 2011), and
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Cottencin et al., 2006). Further
examination of intentional inhibition in relation to alternative
measures of cognitive inhibition are required to establish why
only certain kinds of memory suppression are related to
psychopathological traits.
A key finding from our dataset that goes beyond merely
noting associations between inhibition and hallucination-
proneness concerns intrusion: our data seem to suggest
that tasks like the ICIM pick out a general tendency to
experience intrusive cognitions, and this may mediate the
path to hallucination-like experiences. This is consistent
with long-standing ideas that auditory hallucinations occur
when intrusive cognitions are attributed to a non-self source
because they are ego-dystonic in some way (i.e., unaccept-
able to one's conception of self; Morrison et al., 1995). Beyond
their relevance to the intrusive content of AH, problems with
managing unwanted thoughts and impulses are potentially
relevant to both the role of top-down expectation in
perception (Powers, Kelley, & Corlett, 2016) and the under-
standing of how executive control difficulties potentially
impact upon the management of unusual and distressing
experiences (Hugdahl, 2009). Inhibitory skills are also
affected by sleep problems (Petrovsky et al., 2014), and
hallucinatory experiences around the boundaries of sleep are
known to be common (Jones et al., 2009; Reeve, Sheaves, &
Freeman, 2015).Aside from the inhibition-related results, the lack of evi-
dence for a source memory effect has important implications
in itself. Following Garrison et al. (2017) this provides another
example of how source monitoring in general, and source
memory in particular, may not be part of a cognitive “contin-
uum” for hallucinations and hallucination-like experiences
(cf. Brookwell et al., 2013). Indeed, problems with monitoring
distinctions of selfeother and realityefantasy may be a key
dividing line for thosewith frequent hallucinatory experiences
who do or do not present to mental health services. The ex-
istence of a continuum of such experiences is sometimes
talked about as if it is an “either/or” question (David, 2010;
Lawrie, Hall, McIntosh, Owens, & Johnstone, 2010;
Stanghellini, Langer, Ambrosini, & Cangas, 2012). In contrast,
we would argue that the phenomenological features of hallu-
cinatory states are likely to reflect independent underlying
cognitive processes, which will vary in how continuously they
are distributed in the wider, non-clinical population. Source
memory e picking out a more fundamental disorientation of
self and other emay not show such continuity between clin-
ical and non-clinical groups, while intentional inhibition e
tracking intrusive and uncontrollable cognitive states e may
do so. When one considers the potential additional roles of
perceptual bias (Moseley, Smailes, Ellison, & Fernyhough,
2016), attentional control (Hugdahl, 2009), and agency detec-
tion (Stuke, Kress,Weilnhammer, Sterzer,& Schmack, 2018), it
seems plausible that any phenomenological continuum of
hallucinations is in fact highly likely to be underpinned by at
least some discontinuities at the cognitive and neural levels.
Tracking such continuities and discontinuities requires
careful analysis of the different tasks and processes impli-
cated in hallucination-proneness to date. Given the preva-
lence of small effects and heterogenous methods in
“analogue” studies, a key aim must be replicability: with this
in mind, we are currently part of an international consortium
which is testingmany of the “classic” cognitive tasks linked to
hallucination-proneness in a sample of over 800 healthy in-
dividuals (Moseley, 2018). It will also be important to deploy
similar tasks with people who have frequent (i.e., daily or
weekly) hallucinatory experiences, such as non-clinical voice-
hearers (Alderson-Day et al., 2017; Sommer et al., 2010).
Research with such cohorts has included some cognitive as-
sessments (e.g., Daalman, Verkooijen, Derks, Aleman, &
Sommer, 2012) but has not always included standard mea-
sures of source memory or auditory signal detection.
A further observation from our data regarded associa-
tions between ICIM performance and proneness to visual
hallucinations. Using scores from the visual subscale of the
LSHS in the regression analysis indicated a similar associ-
ation between intentional inhibition and visual hallucina-
tions (albeit while producing a non-normal distribution of
residuals). This might imply that intentional inhibition not
only underlies auditory hallucinations, but also those in the
visual modality. Further research is needed to explore links
between inhibition and hallucinations in specific modalities
(for an example of this approach, see Aynsworth, Nemat,
Collerton, Smailes, & Dudley, 2017; Smailes, Burdis,
Gregoriou, Fenton, & Dudley, 2018); the data presented
here are merely suggestive of inhibition as a process rele-
vant to hallucinations across a range of modalities. The
c o r t e x 1 1 3 ( 2 0 1 9 ) 2 6 7e2 7 8 275results for the temporal context confusion score (and its
apparently stronger relation to hallucination-proneness
than intrusive thoughts) also highlight the need for taking
into account contextual factors on the ICIM: we recommend
that future studies using the task deploy the TCC as their
primary outcome for individual differences analysis of
hallucinatory traits, which would also align with the more
recent use of similar continuous recognition tasks (e.g.,
Wahlen, Nahum, Gabriel, & Schnider, 2011).
These findings have some limitations which need to be
consideredwhen interpreting the results. First, wewere reliant
on participants’ self-reported proneness to hallucinations and
intrusions, and did not assess them in person regarding their
mental health or other potential confounds, such as substance
use history. Necessarily, this limits what can be said about the
sample tested: on the one hand, some of the samplemay have
previously received psychiatric diagnoses and may have more
in common with a clinical cohort; on the other hand, levels of
overall hallucination-proneness may have been too low to
effectively pursue our research questions. While the former is
arguably unlikely for a young, university-based sample, it is
possible that deploying a more extensive pre-screening stage,
or preselecting high and low hallucination-proneness groups,
would have increased the range of our questionnaire data.
However, as shown in Fig. 1, a substantial minority of our
sample scored at 50% or higher on the LSHS-A, requiring them
to endorse “Often” or “Almost Always” for a number of hallu-
cination items. Moreover, the pattern of results observed here
(replication of a relation to ICIM performance and lack of a
source memory effect) would not easily be explained by levels
of hallucination-proneness being too low in the sample overall.
A second concern regards gender. Gender imbalances are
common in university samples (Dickinson, Adelson, & Owen,
2012) and the large number of female compared to male par-
ticipants in the present study precludes generalisations to the
general population. It is possible that the use of amale voice on
the source memory task in particular may have affected per-
formance in a largely female cohort. We have, however, pre-
viously observed a similar null effect (i.e., no relation between
sourcememoryperformance andhallucination-proneness) on
a taskwith a female speaker and similar gender ratio (Garrison
et al., 2017). Finally, without a larger battery of classic inhibi-
tion tasks (such as the Stroop or Flanker paradigms), these
data cannot show that intentional cognitive inhibition is the
only kind of inhibitory control relevant to hallucinations and
intrusions. Prior studies have demonstrated this specificity
(e.g., Paulik et al., 2008), but a more extensive analysis of task
demands and executive functioning components of inten-
tional inhibition e perhaps via latent variable modelling
(Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000) e would be an
important avenue for future research. Other paradigms that
appear to track memory intrusions will also be important to
include in this endeavour (Brebion, David, Bressan, Ohlsen, &
Pilowsky, 2009; Sugimori et al., 2011).5. Conclusion
In conclusion, intentional inhibition is a cognitive mechanism
that can be related to hallucination-proneness and intrusivethoughts. This appears to be largely independent of source
monitoring ability and may act as a marker of a potential
cognitive continuum underlying proneness to unusual expe-
riences - at least for non-clinical populations. Further exam-
ination of inhibitory skills in people with frequent
hallucinations is required to understand more about how the
merely intrusive becomes the uncontrollable, spontaneous,
and perceptual.
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